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Abstract 1 
 2 
 Much of the debate about reciprocity in humans and other primates hinges on proximate 3 
mechanisms, or more precisely, the contingency of one service on another. While there is good 4 
evidence for long-term statistical contingencies of services given and received in primates, 5 
results for short-term behavioral contingencies are very mixed. Indeed, controlled experiments 6 
using artificial tasks and explicit turn-taking were unlikely to find short-term effects, as we show 7 
here. We therefore used more naturalistic experiments to test for short-term contingencies of 8 
grooming on food sharing and vice versa in one group of chimpanzees and two groups of 9 
bonobos. Overall, we found significant effects of grooming on food sharing and vice versa, 10 
however, in the chimpanzees these effects disappeared when controlling for long-term 11 
characteristics of the dyad including services exchanged over the whole study period. In the 12 
bonobos, short-term contingencies remained significant which was likely a consequence of 13 
considerable tension surrounding monopolizable food resulting in higher rates of grooming and 14 
other affiliative behaviors around sharing sessions. These results are consistent with the fact that 15 
previous evidence for short-term contingency often involved grooming and that long-term 16 
contingency is more commonly observed in primates. We propose that long-term contingency is 17 
proximately regulated by a ‘relationship score’ computed through a tally of past interactions 18 
which tend to outweigh recent single events. We therefore suggest that future research into the 19 
proximate mechanisms of reciprocity should trace the development of such a score by focusing 20 
on newly formed dyads with no history of interactions. 21 
 22 
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Introduction 24 
 25 
 Reciprocal altruism has received a lot of attention as one of the main evolutionary 26 
pathways to stable cooperation among unrelated individuals, both in humans and other primates 27 
(Trivers, 1971; Trivers, 2006). Indeed, Trivers (1971) suggested that primates should be 28 
predisposed to reciprocal altruism due to their relatively long lifespans, stable group 29 
compositions, and individual recognition, allowing for ample future opportunities to reciprocate; 30 
and he went on to discuss human friendships as a proximate mechanism for such long-term 31 
exchange in our own species. Reciprocal altruism has since received support from theoretical 32 
models (reviewed by Nowak 2006) as well as from empirical studies on human foragers (Allen-33 
Arave et al., 2008; Gurven, 2004a, 2004b; Gurven, 2006; Koster, 2011; Patton, 2005; Ziker & 34 
Schnegg, 2005) and non-human primates (reviewed by Silk 2002; Schino 2007; Schino and 35 
Aureli 2009; Schino and Aureli 2010; Jaeggi and van Schaik 2011). These studies commonly 36 
measure services given and received over a long time period and then test for a statistical 37 
association between them. Since most such tests were statistically significant (Gurven, 2004a; 38 
Jaeggi & van Schaik, 2011) there is good evidence for a long-term statistical contingency in 39 
many primate species. 40 
 41 
Nonetheless, such correlational evidence for reciprocal altruism has been questioned, 42 
mainly on the basis of a lack of evidence for a short-term behavioral contingency between 43 
services given and received (Clutton-Brock, 2009; Hammerstein, 2003). The standard theoretical 44 
implementation of reciprocity as an iterated prisoner’s dilemma in isolated dyads (e.g. Axelrod 45 
and Hamilton 1981) leads to the expectation that every service given is contingent on a 46 
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previously received service in order to avoid defection. In humans, the expectation of giving 47 
upon receiving is explicitly mentioned in some ethnographies on food sharing in small-scale 48 
societies (although others emphasize a lack of such expectations; Gurven 2004a), and children 49 
seem to develop the faculties for such short-term contingencies around mid childhood (House et 50 
al., in review) which coincides with the shift from exclusive household provisioning to 51 
communal resources (Haig, 2010). The evidence for such short-term contingency of one service 52 
on another in studies on nonhuman primates is however very mixed (see Table 1), and more 53 
parsimonious explanations such as mutualism have therefore been endorsed (Clutton-Brock, 54 
2009). Understanding this discrepancy between short-term and long-term contingency, and more 55 
generally, understanding how reciprocity is regulated on a proximate level, is therefore 56 
paramount for drawing inferences about the evolutionary significance of reciprocal altruism for 57 
understanding primate and human cooperation.  58 
 59 
(insert Table 1 about here) 60 
 61 
Brosnan and de Waal (2002) were the first to propose possible proximate mechanisms for 62 
reciprocity in animals. They suggested three mechanisms with increasing cognitive demands: 63 
Symmetry-based reciprocity, which is mediated by general characteristics of the dyad such as age 64 
or rank differences, kinship or affiliation and does not require any score-keeping; attitudinal 65 
reciprocity, which is mediated by a mirroring of fluctuating attitudes in social partners reflected 66 
in changes in recently shown behavior; and calculated reciprocity, which is based on mental 67 
score-keeping and memory of recent interactions. In practice, symmetry-based reciprocity has 68 
often been operationalized as long-term contingency and calculated reciprocity as short-term 69 
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contingency, with attitudinal reciprocity being either ignored or lumped with one or the other 70 
(Brosnan et al., 2009; Dufouret al., 2009; Koyama et al., 2006; Schino & Aureli, 2010; de Waal, 71 
1997). Therefore, the proposed evidence for calculated reciprocity largely equates to the effects 72 
of one service on another as compiled in Table 1. Most relevant here is a classic study of de 73 
Waal (1997) on chimpanzees in which he found that grooming significantly increased an 74 
individual’s subsequent chances of obtaining food, and that this effect was (i) specific to the 75 
groomer, (ii) independent of the current state of the relationship, (iii) behaviorally mediated by 76 
decreased resistance to food requests, and (iv) stronger in dyads that rarely groomed. In addition, 77 
there was a weak trend for sharing to be followed by more grooming.  78 
 79 
A striking pattern about the tests of short-term contingencies compiled in Table 1 is the 80 
strong discrepancy between experimental studies employing a naturalistic design (defined here 81 
as using naturally occurring behaviors such as grooming, coalitionary support or food sharing in 82 
a whole group setting), and those employing a more artificial design (experimental tasks such as 83 
pulling a tray to deliver food or exchanging tokens, subject pairs isolated from group, alternating 84 
roles as donor and recipient). In fact, positive evidence for short-term contingency is 85 
significantly associated with a naturalistic design (Fisher’s exact P<0.05). The same is true when 86 
the sample is restricted to studies on great apes. This casts doubt on calculated reciprocity as an 87 
underlying mechanism of short-term contingencies, as such a strategy might be expected more in 88 
the explicit turn-taking situations of controlled experiments, at least in cognitively advanced 89 
species such as great apes (Brosnan et al., 2009; Dufour et al., 2009; Melis et al., 2008; 90 
Yamamoto & Tanaka, 2009). At the very least, this suggests that artificial turn-taking 91 
experiments fail to trigger the evolved psychology (if present) for calculated reciprocity which 92 
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would not be surprising given that the subjects’ behavior is likely due to behavioral decision 93 
rules triggered by certain aspects of the experiment rather than a complete understanding of the 94 
task the way the experimenters intended (Jaeggi et al., 2010b, Cronin in press). 95 
 96 
 The absence of calculated reciprocity and its operationalizaton as short-term contingency 97 
has recently also been highlighted by Schino and Aureli (2009; 2010). They argue that reciprocal 98 
exchange should be modeled as a biological market, where commodities are exchanged 99 
following the rules of supply and demand in a system driven by partner choice (Noë & 100 
Hammerstein, 1995; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994). Thus, individuals should preferentially interact 101 
with those partners who have provided them with the most benefits in the past, and, imbalances 102 
due to differing bargaining power notwithstanding, exchanges are therefore expected to balance 103 
out over longer time periods (Schino & Aureli, 2009; 2010).  104 
 105 
Indeed, several studies have shown that exchanges become more balanced with time 106 
(Frank & Silk, 2009; Gomes et al., 2009; Schino et al., 2007; Schino & Pellegrini, 2009; Tiddi et 107 
al., 2011), which together with the limited evidence for immediate effects of one service on 108 
another (Table 1) indicates that primate reciprocity is little affected by recent single events. 109 
Furthermore, a clever study by Schino and Pellegrini (2011) shows that even when recent events 110 
do increase the chance of immediate reciprocation, individuals do not strategically take 111 
advantage of this, suggesting a lack of understanding for short-term contingencies. Schino and 112 
Aureli (2009; 2010) therefore urged to take the correlational evidence for long-term contingency 113 
seriously and abandon the narrow focus on short-term contingency as the only evidence for true 114 
contingency. They propose a mediating role of social bonds or ‘friendships’ (Silk 2002) as a 115 
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form of loose emotional book-keeping as a proximate mechanism for the partner choice model, 116 
which does not suffer from the constraints of cognitively more demanding models (Schino & 117 
Aureli, 2009; 2010). According to the partner choice model, short-term contingencies are 118 
therefore only expected in rarely interacting partners where recent events may weigh more 119 
heavily. 120 
 121 
Here we attempt to resolve some of this on-going debate by testing for short-term 122 
contingencies of grooming on food sharing and vice versa in one group of captive chimpanzees 123 
and two groups of captive bonobos. While we test for long-term contingencies elsewhere (Jaeggi 124 
et al., 2010; de Groot, 2011), this study provides a valuable test of the models discussed above 125 
for various reasons: First, both chimpanzees and bonobos are cognitively advanced species and 126 
are therefore expected to be capable of calculated reciprocity. Second, we employ a naturalistic 127 
study design which should increase the chances of finding positive evidence for short-term 128 
contingencies (Table 1). Third, testing two different species and multiple groups allows us to 129 
relate potential differences in short-term or long-term contingencies to social or ecological 130 
characteristics while also allowing us to pool data from all subjects in order to maximize 131 
statistical power.  132 
 133 
Hypotheses 134 
 135 
Following the introduction above, we test the following hypotheses regarding short-term 136 
contingencies in our study groups: 137 
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· Short-term contingency: We test for short-term contingency by looking at the immediate 138 
effect of grooming on subsequent food sharing and vice versa. We call this the ‘tit-for-tat 139 
model’ (see Methods). Under the Brosnan and de Waal (2002) model, some evidence of 140 
short-term contingencies is expected in this study as both species should be cognitively 141 
capable of calculated reciprocity. Under the partner choice model on the other hand (Schino 142 
& Aureli, 2009; 2010), short-term contingencies are expected to be negligible if services 143 
given are explained by long-term aspects of the relationship (see below). This should be 144 
particularly true for the chimpanzees as long-term contingency of food, grooming and 145 
support has been demonstrated previously (Jaeggi et al., 2010a). Therefore, we expand the 146 
tit-for-tat model with a number of controls to exclude other explanations: 147 
o Partner-specificity: Short-term contingency has to be partner specific in order to 148 
reflect calculated reciprocity. Following de Waal (1997) we test this by adding the 149 
effect of grooming by third parties on subsequent food sharing which, if positive, 150 
would simply reflect a ‘good mood’ induced by grooming rather than calculated 151 
reciprocity. 152 
o Current state of relationship: Increased food sharing should not simply reflect the 153 
state of the relationship between owner and approacher (de Waal, 1997). We control 154 
for this by adding the effect of grooming by the owner on subsequent sharing. By 155 
itself, such an effect would simply indicate the direction in which services usually 156 
flow within the dyad; in interaction with grooming by the approacher it might reflect 157 
attitudinal reciprocity. 158 
o Social distance: The contingent effect of grooming on food sharing was found to be 159 
more pronounced in socially distant partners (de Waal 1997) which is compatible 160 
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with the partner-choice model in which recent events only weigh heavily in dyads 161 
who rarely interact (Schino & Aureli, 2009; 2010). We test this by adding an 162 
interaction with long-term relationship quality, as a measure of social distance, to the 163 
short-term contingency effect. 164 
o Long-term contingency: The partner-choice model would predict that any short-term 165 
effects are outweighed by the longer history of the relationship. We test this by 166 
adding relationship quality as an independent predictor of food sharing or grooming. 167 
o General relationship characteristics: We control for general effects of kinship, 168 
dominance rank, and sex combination by including the appropriate variables as 169 
independent predictors. In combination with relationship quality, positive effects of 170 
these variables might reflect symmetry-based reciprocity (Brosnan & de Waal 2002). 171 
· Behavioral mediation: A contingent effect of grooming on sharing has been suggested to be 172 
behaviorally mediated by food owners’ decreased resistance to food requests (de Waal, 173 
1997). We test this by analyzing the effects of all aforementioned predictors on the likelihood 174 
of food requests being met by a negative or even aggressive reaction. Furthermore, it has also 175 
been reported that grooming and other affiliative behaviors are generally increased during 176 
feeding sessions in order to reduce the tension surrounding monopolizable food, especially in 177 
bonobos (de Waal, 1992). As such increased grooming due to the need to reduce tension 178 
could mediate short-term contingency, we also recorded the occurrence of grooming and 179 
affiliative contact during feeding sessions, including during approaches to food owners. 180 
 181 
Methods 182 
 183 
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Study groups and observation methods 184 
 185 
We studied one group of chimpanzees and two groups of bonobos. Table 2 gives a brief 186 
overview of the group compositions and observation periods. In each group there were three 187 
dyads comprised of maternal relatives (mother-son, mother-daughter, or maternal half-siblings). 188 
Even though paternal relatedness was known through pedigree or genetic paternity analyses, it 189 
was not included here as preliminary analyses did not reveal any differences between paternal 190 
kin and nonkin. Only one individual was a member of both bonobo groups, which is why we 191 
treated them as independent social units. More detailed information on all the subjects and food 192 
interaction patterns can also be found elsewhere (Jaeggi et al., 2010a; de Groot, 2011).  193 
 194 
(insert Table 2 about here) 195 
 196 
To induce food sharing we used monopolizable paper bags filled with fruits and 197 
vegetables, as previously reported (Jaeggi et al., 2010a; de Groot, 2011). In most experiments, 198 
one or two bags were introduced at a time, either by hiding them in the enclosure or by tossing 199 
them to certain individuals in order to balance ownership. Sharing experiments were usually 200 
conducted once a day in the chimpanzee group (early afternoon) and twice a day in the bonobo 201 
groups (morning, early afternoon) with the exact timing depending on the schedule of regular 202 
feedings on that day in the zoos. The apes quickly associated the presence of certain observers 203 
with the bag experiments and were generally well aware of any feeding preparations such that 204 
they were often expecting experiments even if we tried to conceal the bags (cf. de Waal 1992). 205 
All sharing sessions were videotaped and subsequently coded using Mangold InterAct or the 206 
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Noldus Observer. In addition to all food interactions we recorded grooming and other affiliative 207 
behavior (embrace, socio-sexual behavior) throughout the day using all occurrence sampling, but 208 
here we restrict analyses to grooming one hour immediately preceding and following each 209 
sharing session (as well as during the sharing session). The reason we chose a 1h time window 210 
was that this was typically the interval of uninterrupted resting/grooming time between feedings 211 
in both zoos; in any longer time period additional interactions would have interfered and diluted 212 
the effects (or lack thereof) of one service on another. The bonobos in both PLD groups could 213 
not be observed before the morning sharing sessions and also did not have unrestricted access to 214 
each other for grooming as individuals were separated into smaller groups for the night. Hence 215 
no prior grooming information on these sharing sessions could be included. 216 
 217 
Following Feistner and McGrew (1989), food sharing was defined as the un-resisted 218 
transfer of food from one individual (owner) to another (approacher) out of the owner’s hand, 219 
foot, or mouth. Acquisition of food that was not in physical contact with another individual, such 220 
as ‘collect near’ (de Waal, 1989) or ‘recovery’ (Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 1989), was not 221 
considered a transfer because individuals never protested such transfers and therefore did not 222 
seem to claim ownership. Likewise, forced transfers were not considered as they do not 223 
constitute a service that is likely to be reciprocated (Jaeggi et al., 2010a). The majority of un-224 
resisted transfers occurred in the form of passive transfers or tolerated taking; active forms of 225 
transfer only occurred among the chimpanzees (Jaeggi et al., 2010a,b). In addition to the 226 
occurrence of transfers we also noted the behavior of the approacher, in particular whether they 227 
used any socio-positive behavior such as affiliative contact, grooming or socio-sexual behavior 228 
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and the reaction of the owner as positive (conducive to food transfer), neutral no reaction) or 229 
negative (impeding food transfer, see below). 230 
 231 
Statistical analyses 232 
 233 
We used generalized linear mixed effects models (GLMM; Bolker et al. 2009) with 234 
binomial error distribution to test for the effects of one service on another with the unit of 235 
analysis being each owner-approacher dyad that interacted over food for each sharing session. 236 
Models with FGS as the dependent variable were weighted by the total number of approaches. 237 
We controlled for repeated sampling of the same individuals by including the ID’s of owner and 238 
approacher as random factors. Furthermore, we included group and species ID (here also 239 
equivalent to location) as random factors in the models combining all study groups and group ID 240 
in models combining the two bonobo groups. GLMM’s were fitted using the lme4 package 241 
version 0.999375-42 (Bates et al., 2011) in R 2.14.1 (R Development Core Team, 2012). 242 
Statistical significance was assessed at the α=0.05 level. We fitted two different models for each 243 
analysis, a ‘tit-for-tat model’ and a ‘best-fit model’. The tit-for-tat model included only the 244 
previously received service (grooming, food sharing) as a predictor. The best-fit model also 245 
included a range of possible control variables (see Hypotheses). We report only the variables 246 
retained in the model with the lowest AIC resulting from a stepwise selection procedure. In 247 
contrast to previous studies (e.g. de Waal 1997) this allowed us to test for several competing 248 
hypotheses at the same time. 249 
 250 
Our response variables to test for short-term contingency and its behavioral mediation were:  251 
12 
 
· Food-getting success (FGS): Proportion, defined following de Waal (1997) as the 252 
proportion of approaches to within arm’s reach of a food owner that led to food sharing. 253 
We used this as the main sharing measure (rather than number of transfers or amount of 254 
food shared) as it controls for differences in the opportunity to share. This model was 255 
weighted by the total number of approaches as FGS calculated from a small number of 256 
approaches can easily reach very high or very low values. 257 
· Grooming received after sharing: Binary, did the former approacher groom the former 258 
food owner within 1h after a sharing session? 259 
· Negative or aggressive reaction: Binary, we scored a negative reaction if the owner 260 
showed any behavior impeding transfer such as turning away, holding food away, 261 
leaving, or aggressing the approacher by threatening, bluffing, or physically attacking. 262 
This was also scored as an aggressive reaction. 263 
The main predictors for the tit-for-tat models were: 264 
· Grooming received before sharing: Binary, did the approacher groom the food owner 265 
within 1h before a sharing session? This was the main predictor for models on FGS. We 266 
used a binary rather than continuous measure since de Waal (1997) found that the effect 267 
of grooming on food sharing was independent of duration. 268 
· Food-getting success given: Proportion, what was the FGS the food owner allowed a 269 
specific approacher during the previous sharing session? This was the main predictor for 270 
models on grooming received after sharing. 271 
The full list of control variables was: 272 
· Grooming received from third parties before sharing: binary, did the current food 273 
owner receive grooming from individuals other than the current approacher within 1h 274 
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before the sharing session? This tests for partner specificity or the ‘good mood 275 
hypothesis’ which would predict indiscriminate sharing after being groomed (de 276 
Waal, 1997).  277 
· Grooming given by food owner before sharing: binary, did the current food owner 278 
groom the current approacher within 1h before the sharing session? This controls for 279 
an effect of (the current state of) the relationship as an effect on subsequent sharing 280 
by itself would indicate the direction in which services usually flow within the dyad 281 
whereas an effect in interaction with grooming received would indicate a fluctuation 282 
in the propensity to provide services within the dyad that is consistent with attitudinal 283 
reciprocity or shifting market forces in the partner choice model. 284 
· Relationship quality: Continuous, calculated following Fraser et al. (2008) as the first 285 
factor of a principal components analysis including time spent in proximity, time 286 
spent grooming, and proportion of agonistic interactions in which coalitionary 287 
support was provided for each dyad (Jaeggi et al., 2010a). This controls for long-term 288 
contingency consistent with symmetry-based reciprocity and partner choice. 289 
· Maternal kinship: Binary, are the owner and approacher maternal relatives? This 290 
controls for kinship biases. 291 
· Cardinal rank difference: Continuous, the difference between the cardinal ranks of 292 
approacher and owner, calculated as normalized David’s scores (de Vries, Stevens, & 293 
Vervaecke, 2006). This controls for transfers being due to differences in resource-294 
holding potential as well as for similarity biases proposed for symmetry-based 295 
reciprocity 296 
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· Sex combination: Factorial, female-female (baseline), female-male, male-female and 297 
male-male. This controls for biases due to less tangible sex-specific exchanges such 298 
as long-term exchange of food for mating (Gomes & Boesch, 2009). 299 
 300 
Finally, we allowed for interaction effects between the main predictor variable (grooming 301 
or FGS received) and relationship quality, in order to test the social distance hypothesis, as well 302 
as with grooming given by owner (for models predicting FGS) in order to further tease apart the 303 
effects of contingent exchange and the current state of the relationship. We report each analysis 304 
for all groups combined and for the two species separately (with the two bonobo groups 305 
combined). We also ran all analyses for the two bonobo groups separately but do not report these 306 
results here as the sample sizes were too small to make confident inferences about further 307 
differences between them. We used Chi square tests to compare general patterns on the 308 
occurrence of grooming and affiliative behaviors around sharing sessions as well as negative or 309 
aggressive reactions to food requests.  310 
 311 
Results 312 
 313 
General patterns 314 
 315 
 In total, we recorded 1612 approaches to food owners in 836 different dyads of which 316 
239 (14.8%) led to food transfer. Among the bonobos 95 (9.1%) of 1043 approaches in 477 317 
dyads resulted in transfer, significantly less than among chimpanzees (144 of 569, 25.3%, 358 318 
dyads; Chi square test Χ
2
1= 76.5, P < 0.001, cf. Figure 1). The majority of transfers among the 319 
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bonobos were from subordinates to dominants (64, 67.3% vs. 31, 32.7%) whereas more were 320 
from dominants to subordinates among the chimpanzees (109, 75.7% vs. 35, 24.3%). Finally, 321 
among bonobos most transfers were from females to males (61, 64.2%) followed by transfers 322 
from males to females (18, 18.9%) and among females (16, 16.8%). No transfers among males 323 
were observed. Among chimpanzees, the majority of transfers were from males to female (75, 324 
52.1%), followed by transfers among females (45, 31.3%), from females to males (13, 9%) and 325 
among males (11, 7,6%). 326 
 327 
Grooming occurred in 64 (13.0%) of 592 dyads that could be observed before a sharing 328 
session and subsequently interacted over food. This percentage did not vary significantly across 329 
the two species (Bonobos: 14.5%, Chimpanzees: 12.1%, Χ
2
1= 0.41, P = 0.52). On the other hand, 330 
grooming occurred in 147 (19.1%) of the 769 dyads that had previously interacted over food and 331 
could be observed after a sharing session. This percentage was significantly different across 332 
groups, being much lower in the chimpanzee group (Bonobos: 26.9%, Chimpanzees: 7.2%, Χ
2
1 333 
= 45.5, P < 0.001, cf. Figure 2).  334 
 335 
Short-term contingency 336 
 337 
 338 
The tit-for-tat models showed a significant effect of grooming on food sharing and vice 339 
versa in both species combined (Table 3, tit-for-tat models). However, this effect disappeared 340 
when including control variables (Table 3, best-fit models). Indeed, the effect of grooming on 341 
FGS became negative, especially for dyads with a low relationship quality as indicated by the 342 
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interaction term. The same was true for grooming received from third parties. Sharing was also 343 
lower the more the approacher outranked the owner but higher among maternal kin. Grooming 344 
received after sharing was entirely explained by the long-term relationship quality of the dyad 345 
and not FGS given in the previous sharing session. Thus, the short-term contingency hypothesis 346 
was not supported in both species combined as FGS and grooming seemed better explained by 347 
general characteristics of the dyad.  348 
 349 
(insert Table 3 about here) 350 
 351 
Among the bonobos, the tit-for-tat model showed a positive effect of grooming received 352 
on FGS which became significant in the best-fit model when controlling for grooming given 353 
(Table 4). FGS significantly predicted grooming received after sharing in the tit-for-tat model 354 
and remained a strong predictor with a statistical trend in the best-fit model with a smaller but 355 
significant effect of relationship quality. Thus, short-term contingency in bonobos seemed 356 
consistent with the exchange of one service on another as grooming received predicted food 357 
sharing, especially if no grooming was given, and food sharing and relationship quality 358 
explained subsequent grooming received. 359 
 360 
(insert Table 4 about here) 361 
(insert Figure 1 about here) 362 
 363 
Among the chimpanzees on the other hand, the tit-for-tat models showed no significant 364 
effect and the main predictors turned negative or disappeared altogether in the best-fit model 365 
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(Table 4). FGS was negatively predicted by grooming received, both by approachers and third 366 
parties, but positively by grooming given and received in dyads with high relationship quality, as 367 
indicated by the interaction terms. This suggests an effect of the current state of the relationship. 368 
Furthermore, FGS was negatively predicted by relationship quality (except in interaction with 369 
grooming) and cardinal rank difference, but positively predicted by kinship. Grooming after 370 
sharing was entirely predicted by relationship quality and rank difference. Thus, the probability 371 
of providing a service in chimpanzees was best explained by the current state of the relationship 372 
and long-term characteristics of the dyad but not by the contingent exchange of one service on 373 
another. 374 
 375 
(insert Figure 2 about here) 376 
 377 
Behavioral mediation 378 
 379 
 Negative reactions to food requests were observed in 130 (37.5%) of 776 dyads that 380 
interacted over food. This percentage was not significantly different in the two species (Bonobos: 381 
37.4%, Chimpanzees: 37.7%, Χ
2
1 = 0.01, P = 0.92). Aggressive reactions, a subset of negative 382 
reactions, occurred in 35 (4.3%) of 820 dyads which was higher in the bonobos with a statistical 383 
trend (Bonobos: 5.2%, Chimpanzees: 2.9%, Χ
2
1= 2.73, P = 0.099). 384 
 385 
There was no evidence that short-term contingency of grooming on food sharing was 386 
mediated by a decrease in negative or aggressive reactions to food requests as the main predictor 387 
variables were not significant in the tit-for-tat models and not retained in the best-fit models in 388 
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all groups combined or both species separately (Supplementary Table 1). The probability of 389 
encountering negative or aggressive reactions seemed better explained by general characteristics 390 
of the dyad such as kinship, rank difference, or sex combination than by recent interactions. 391 
 392 
Among bonobos, grooming during a sharing session occurred in 32 (6.7%) of 477 dyads 393 
that interacted over food and in 24 (5% of dyads) it occurred during approaches to food owners. 394 
Affiliative behaviors including grooming occurred in 92 (19.2%) dyads and in 44 (9.2%) they 395 
occurred during food approaches. On the other hand, grooming during the sharing session 396 
between individuals who interacted over food was never observed among the chimpanzees and 397 
affiliative behaviors occurred only in two (0.6%) of 358 dyads who interacted over food, both 398 
times during a food approach. Thus, grooming and affiliative behaviors were significantly more 399 
frequent in bonobos both during food approaches and during the session generally (Grooming 400 
during approaches: Χ
2
1 = 18.6, P < 0.001, grooming during session: Χ
2
1 = 25.0, P < 0.001, 401 
affiliative behavior during approach: Χ
2
1 = 29.5, P < 0.001, affiliative behavior during session: 402 
Χ
2
1 = 71.8, P < 0.001). This indicates a higher need to reduce tension in a situation involving 403 
monopolizable food among bonobos which could have mediated the short-term contingency 404 
reported above. 405 
 406 
(insert Figure 3 about here) 407 
 408 
Discussion 409 
 410 
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 We tested for short-term contingencies of grooming on food sharing and vice versa in our 411 
two closest living relatives, bonobos and chimpanzees, in order to help resolve some of the 412 
debate about proximate mechanisms of reciprocal altruism and thus the role of reciprocity in 413 
explaining primate and human cooperation more generally. We found significant effects of 414 
grooming on food sharing and vice versa, but when controlling for other variables sharing and 415 
grooming were better explained by long-term characteristics of the dyad such as kinship, 416 
differences in cardinal rank, or services exchanged over longer time periods as measured by 417 
relationship quality. There was also no evidence that recent events decreased the likelihood of 418 
encountering negative or aggressive reactions to food requests, which has been proposed to 419 
mediate contingent exchange (de Waal, 1997). This pattern was true overall and among the 420 
chimpanzees, and together with previous findings of long-term contingency of food, grooming 421 
and support among the same chimpanzees (Jaeggi et al., 2010a) is consistent with the partner 422 
choice model in which the likelihood of providing a service depends on the history of past 423 
interactions, outweighing single recent events (Schino & Aureli, 2009; 2010). In addition, the 424 
positive interactions between recent grooming and relationship quality found among the 425 
chimpanzees (Table 4) do indicate an effect of the current state of the relationship, perhaps 426 
consistent with the idea of attitudinal reciprocity (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002; de Waal, 2000) or 427 
fluctuations in partner choice due to shifting market forces (Schino & Aureli, 2009; 2010). A 428 
system of calculated reciprocity working on top of other forms of reciprocity in cognitively 429 
advanced species (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002; de Waal, 1997) was however not supported among 430 
the chimpanzees. 431 
 432 
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 Among bonobos we did find significant effects of grooming on food sharing and vice 433 
versa, even after controlling for other factors. But does this really reflect contingent reciprocity 434 
in the sense that is of interest to the broader debate on the evolution of cooperation in humans 435 
(House et al., in review) and animals (Clutton-Brock, 2009; Hammerstein, 2003)? Bonobos in 436 
this study showed little evidence for long-term contingency of food, grooming and support 437 
(Jaeggi et al., 2010; de Groot, 2011), why then the observed short-term contingencies? To 438 
answer this question we have to describe the food sharing psychology of bonobos compared to 439 
chimpanzees. In the wild, chimpanzees after a hunt tend to quickly establish ownership of the 440 
carcass followed by the formation of begging clusters in which ownership is rarely contested and 441 
food pieces are obtained mainly through tolerated passive transfers in response to more or less 442 
persistent begging (e.g. Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 1989; Gilby, 2006; Nishida et al., 1992), 443 
a pattern which is easily replicated in captivity and therefore seems well engrained in the species 444 
psychology (Jaeggi et al., 2010a; de Waal, 1989, 1997). A typical such interaction is illustrated 445 
in Figure 3 (see also Supplementary Video 1). Unfortunately, relatively little is still known about 446 
sharing in wild bonobos but it seems like sharing interactions tend to include few individuals and 447 
rates of transfers are relatively low (Fruth & Hohmann, 2002; Hohmann & Fruth, 1993; White, 448 
1994) unless they include provisioned food (Kuroda, 1984). In captivity, bonobos are more 449 
stressed than chimpanzees by situations involving monopolizable food (Wobber et al., 2010a), 450 
and while they tend to monopolize less than chimpanzees of comparable ages (Hare et al., 2007; 451 
Wobber et al., 2010b) they fail to use persistent begging as a means to obtain food once 452 
ownership has been established, trying instead to snatch food or claim it by force such that 453 
success rates are low and the majority of transfers as defined here are forced and directed up the 454 
hierarchy (Jaeggi et al., 2010a; de Waal, 1992; cf. General Patterns, Supplementary Video). In 455 
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fact, it has been noted that “feeding sessions seemed to be of a more tolerant character in the 456 
chimpanzee, which appeared inhibited in the use of force” (de Waal, 1992, p.48). Further 457 
expressions of tension surrounding monopolizable food may be the significantly lower success 458 
rates and higher levels of aggressive reactions to food requests found among the bonobos in this 459 
study and indeed the relatively high levels of aggression and oftentimes strong dominance 460 
hierarchies formed in zoo-housed bonobos generally (Jaeggi et al., 2010a; Stevens et al., 2005; 461 
2008).  462 
Thus, our results on short-term contingency among bonobos make sense in light of the 463 
considerable tension surrounding monopolizable food. Indeed, bonobos in this study sometimes 464 
seemed nervous and reluctant to approach food owners, especially if they were socially distant. 465 
Rather than confidently claiming food the way chimpanzees often do, approachers would 466 
sometimes hesitantly groom, touch or embrace food owners before attempting to take food 467 
(Figure 3). This was hardly ever observed among the chimpanzees. Tension around 468 
monopolizable food resulted in significantly higher rates of grooming and other affiliative 469 
behaviors during sharing sessions including during approaches to food owners and perhaps 470 
grooming in anticipation of and certainly in the aftermath of sharing sessions, which was 471 
significantly more common than among chimpanzees. These patterns are consistent with the 472 
reported frequent use of grooming and socio-sexual behavior in competitive feeding situations 473 
among wild bonobos (Kano, 1980; Kuroda, 1984) and higher levels of grooming compared to 474 
chimpanzees during food sharing sessions (de Waal, 1992), which seems to have carried over 475 
into the periods immediately preceding and following the sharing sessions. Since grooming is 476 
well known to alleviate tension and reduce stress-levels in both groomer and groomee (Dunbar, 477 
2010), this might well be the mechanism responsible for the observed short-term contingency. It 478 
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is nonetheless noteworthy that this mechanism was partner-specific, sensitive to the direction of 479 
grooming and not outweighed by long-term characteristics of the relationship (Table 4), which is 480 
perhaps consistent with calculated reciprocity (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002; de Waal, 1997). 481 
However, this mechanism failed to generate consistent evidence for long-term contingency of 482 
food, grooming and support in the same subjects (Jaeggi et al., 2010a; de Groot, 2011) and can 483 
therefore not explain the existence of such contingencies in other species (cf. Silk 2002; Schino 484 
2007; Schino and Aureli 2009; 2010; Jaeggi and van Schaik 2011). 485 
 486 
Mechanisms of reciprocity in primates  487 
 488 
 In sum, our results on chimpanzees support a model of primate reciprocity in which 489 
services are given based on a tally of past interactions that build up over the course of a 490 
relationship, leading to a long-term contingency of services given and received (Schino & 491 
Aureli, 2009; 2010; Trivers, 1971). According to this model recent single events are often 492 
negligible, explaining the mixed results of studies examining short-term contingencies in 493 
primates (Table 1), and exchanges (or statistical measures thereof) become more balanced over 494 
time (Frank and Silk, 2009; Gomes et al., 2009; Tiddi et al., 2011). The short-term contingency 495 
observed among the bonobos in this study was likely due to a tension-reduction mechanism 496 
specific to the food sharing situation, but may nonetheless fulfill the criteria for calculated 497 
reciprocity (Brosnan and de Waal, 2002; de Waal, 1997) despite a failure to generate long-term 498 
contingency. The same mechanism may well be at work in some of the other positive effects 499 
found in the naturalistic studies in Table 1, all of which describe an effect of grooming on 500 
another service. Finally, the differences between our tit-for-tat models and best-fit models 501 
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emphasize the importance of taking into account the general characteristics of the subjects’ 502 
relationships as these outweighed any short-term effect among the chimpanzees. Overall, these 503 
results suggest that long-term contingencies might be more common in primate groups when the 504 
importance of single events is outweighed by a tally of past interactions. However, when 505 
mechanisms to reduce tension are needed short-term contingencies may arise.  506 
 507 
 The most likely psychological mechanism for long-term contingency is for the 508 
probability of providing a benefit to a specific other at any given time to be mediated by some 509 
kind of ‘relationship score’ (Jaeggi et al., 2010b; Schino & Aureli, 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 510 
2008; Tooby et al., 2008). This score should minimally encode a tally of past interactions, but 511 
could possibly also be combined with a kinship coefficient, relative formidability, or dominance 512 
rank of ego and other (Jaeggi et al., 2010b; Lieberman et al., 2007; Sell et al., 2009; Tooby & 513 
Cosmides, 2008; Tooby et al., 2008). However, this does not require keeping a detailed memory 514 
of all past interactions, rather, recent events may only be noted if they deviate substantially from 515 
the value the score has asymptoted to over the course of the relationship (Tooby & Cosmides, 516 
2008; Tooby et al., 2008). That such fluctuations do occur is evidenced by the interactions 517 
between recent grooming and relationship quality found here (Tables 3 and 4). Computationally, 518 
this tally is probably encoded as the likelihood of providing a service to another individual given 519 
a certain cost-benefit situation, but subjectively it may be experienced as an emotion such as 520 
sympathy (Jaeggi et al., 2010b; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008; Tooby et al., 2008). 521 
 522 
Cognitive constraints on reciprocity? 523 
 524 
24 
 
It has been argued that primates, and possibly even humans are unlikely to have the 525 
cognitive requirements for a tit-for-tat like psychology involving a detailed memory of past 526 
interactions and effects of one service on another due to limitations in memory, temporal 527 
discounting, and other necessary preconditions (Stevens & Hauser, 2004; Stevens et al., 2010; 528 
Stevens et al., 2005). However, astonishing dedicated cognitive specializations are found in 529 
many organisms, for instance the incredible spatial memory, causal understanding of tools, and 530 
understanding of others’ intentions in corvids (Emery & Clayton, 2004). These and other 531 
examples of surprising cognitive abilities in animals (Shettleworth, 2009) suggest that animals 532 
can evolve almost any dedicated cognitive abilities, provided that selection pressures are strong 533 
enough. The lack of a tit-for-tat psychology in primates therefore suggests that there was simply 534 
no need for them to evolve such abilities. Our study adds some weight to this notion by showing 535 
that short-term contingencies were absent in the presence of more loosely regulated long-term 536 
contingency in the chimpanzees, and that short-term contingencies were largely restricted to 537 
tension-reduction mechanisms such as grooming in a competitive situation in the bonobos and 538 
perhaps other naturalistic studies with positive effects (cf. Table 1). Like others (Schino & 539 
Aureli, 2009; 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008; Tooby et al., 2008; Trivers, 1971), we therefore 540 
suggest that a long-term statistical contingency between services given and received mediated by 541 
stable social relationships and the computation of a tally of past interactions is enough to be 542 
favored by natural selection on reciprocal altruism. Such a mechanism may also explain most of 543 
the contingencies observed in human populations (e.g. Gurven, 2004a) with a sensitivity for 544 
short-term contingencies being acquired relatively late in development (House et al., in review) 545 
and perhaps only necessary for interactions with relative strangers with little history of past 546 
interactions. 547 
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 548 
Future directions 549 
 550 
In long-lived species with stable groups and individual recognition there is ample 551 
opportunity for reciprocal interactions (Trivers, 1971) hence short-term contingency is always 552 
likely to be outweighed by the effects of the two partners’ longer history of interactions. The 553 
only time one should therefore see a strong effect of recent interactions is when dyads are newly 554 
formed and start their relationship from scratch (Roberts & Sherratt, 1998). Examples of this in 555 
primate would be when individuals immigrate into a new group or start entering the social fabric 556 
of adults as they mature. A naturalistic experiment of the same kind is provided in zoos when 557 
new individuals are introduced into a social group. Future work into the psychological regulation 558 
of reciprocity in primates should therefore focus on such newly formed dyads and test whether 559 
recent interactions weigh heavily in the beginning, how many recent interactions are taken into 560 
account, and how long it takes for a tally of past interactions to outweigh single events. Finally, 561 
the differences between our tit-for-tat and best-fit models draw attention to the fact that the 562 
behavior of nonhuman primates under investigation is strongly influenced by the history and 563 
general characteristics of their social relationships which should therefore be controlled for in 564 
any future study on the proximate regulation of reciprocity or cooperation more generally. 565 
  566 
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Figure Legends 789 
Fig.1: Does grooming lead to more food sharing? Mean +SD food-getting success if the 790 
approacher did (grey bars) or did not groom (white bars) the food owner immediately prior to the 791 
sharing session in bonobos and chimpanzees. The effect was significant only among bonobos 792 
(Table 4). 793 
Fig.2: Is more food sharing rewarded by more grooming? Grooming (yes/no) of previous food 794 
owners by previous approachers immediately following a food sharing session as a function of 795 
previous food-getting success by those approachers. Lines are fitted on the raw data with 796 
univariate generalized linear models and shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals. The 797 
effect was significant only among bonobos (Table 4). 798 
Fig.3: Typical examples of food interactions among bonobos and chimpanzees (see also 799 
Supplementary Video): a) a bonobo female (front) established affiliative contact with another 800 
female in possession of food (back) before attempting to take food (picture credit J. M. G. 801 
Stevens); b) two chimpanzee females (left and right) confidently claim food from a male in 802 
possession of food (center) who offers little resistance (picture credit A. V. Jaeggi). 803 
Figure(s)
Click here to download high resolution image
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